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SHARPENING THE THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLAN (TEP) FOCUS: THE IMPACT OF HIGHER ORDER BELIEFS AND VALUES
The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat.
Hart-Rudman Commission
Most citizens, diplomats, politicians, and senior military leaders probably agree that nation-states are the relevant agents in matters of political discourse. It is a limited perspective, however, as it covers only the international arena where nations sign treaties and conduct their daily affairs. The aspect it erroneously overlooks is the radically important underlying beliefs and values that manifest themselves irrespective of political borders or governments that change over time. It seems intuitively apparent that joining the two views into a larger picture is desirable.
The Department of Defense (DoD) may be able to improve the theater engagement piece of the Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) by taking beliefs and values explicitly into the calculus. Because of the enduring nature of beliefs and values, this paper suggests that the long-term perspective is particularly relevant. As a collateral advantage, the other DPP elements and even crisis action planning may benefit. If theater engagement plans (TEPs)
will be improved by considering higher order beliefs and values, they might be further enhanced by encouraging the interagency process. In any case, the "shaping" leg of the National Military Strategy (NMS) may be strengthened.
To provide a plausible basis on which to build, the paper will employ the recognized scholarly accomplishments of the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington's work has been widely discussed for its value in showing that civilizations, a concept to be explained below, are key to analyzing beliefs and values.
The focus of this paper is an analysis of higher order cultural values in the preparation of TEPs. It will have nothing to do directly with the problems associated with U.S. Code
Title 10 issues or the budget process other than to acknowledge that the Unified Command
Commander (CINC) is bereft of real authority to implement the TEP independently of the Services-a serious impediment to using a potent tool. "Another prevalent pattern of thinking and discussion about counter-terrorism is a tendency toward absolute solutions and a rejection of accommodation and finesse. If counter-terrorism is conceived as a war, it is a small step to conclude that in this war there is no substitute for victory and thus no room for compromise. The nature of terrorism and of how American public attention to it has evolved in recent years have made the topic prone to this simplistic pattern of thought. Americans have had little reason to come to terms with the causes or issues associated with the terrorism that has struck closest to their homes and been emblazoned most prominently in their newspapers and their memories. They have had more reason to think of terrorism simply as an evil to be eradicated, rather than a more complex phenomenon with sides that may need to be reckoned with differently."
All members of the Armed Forces have an extraordinary opportunity to reckon differently with other people and cultures. The National Command Authority (NCA) provides strategic guidance in the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), which CJCS translates into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). On that basis, the CINCs plan. CINCs create their TEPs in light of the Prioritized Regional Objectives (PROs). 16 It is not at all clear that the TEP process takes place with consistent conscious regard for the overarching NSS and NMS and in collaboration with other government or civilian agents of national power.
Regional objectives and their prioritization need explanation and interpretation because of their geographic orientation and differences in their relative importance, depending on whose scheme is to be followed. Vital national interests are those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of the nation. The US will do what it must to defend these interests, including, when necessary, using military might unilaterally and decisively. II Shaping activities to be carried out to the extent possible.
Important national interests are those that do not affect national survival, but do affect national well being and the character of the world. In such cases, the US will use its resources to advance these interests insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake. III Shaping activities to be carried out as resources permit
Humanitarian and other interests. In some circumstances, the nation may act because U.S. values demand a response such as response to natural and manmade disasters.
The TEP process generally may need further administrative and substance improvements, at least according to some authors. 19 The remainder of this paper will focus on another way to improve the utility of the product. Melko's insight is that respect for civilizations will decrease the threat to survival and make it possible to enter into constructive engagement for the good of all concerned.
SEEING HIGHER ORDER VALUES
Engaging other civilizations presents complex and occasionally intractable problems.
For example, modernization requires participation in the global economy. Civilizations that fail to respect the value of capital, however, will struggle to participate. Islam, in particular, faces a modernization challenge because of its approach to the accumulation of capital and the creation of corporations hobbles participation in a free-market economy. 31 Globalization requires a speed in action and reaction that challenges underdeveloped nations, however congenial they are with free market economics. For them, an adjustable shock absorber is needed. 
RISK IN DISREGARDING HIGHER ORDER VALUES : WHY THEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
Numerous areas of the world will almost certainly give birth to conflict in future years. A world economic future that is anything less than robust will aggravate matters to the extent that per capita income fails to improve. 36 Relevant to the clash of civilizations, the CIA reports that, "The countries and regions most at risk of falling behind economically are those with endemic internal and/or regional conflicts and those that fail to diversify their economies. The economies of most states in sub-Saharan African and the Middle East and some in Latin America will continue to suffer. A large segment of the Eurasian landmass extending from Central Asia through the Caucasus to parts of southeastern Europe faces dim economic prospects. Within countries, the gap in the standard of living also will increase. Even in rapidly growing countries, large regions will be left behind." 
HOW HIGHER ORDER VALUES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
Having considered the concept of civilizations, the higher order beliefs and values they embody, and the demographic and economic imperatives, it is time to formulate the key recommendation: ensure conscientious coordination of effort across unified command boundaries, focusing on the underlying civilizational forces that drive, at least in part, subnational, national, and transnational policy and associated political phenomena ranging from economics to terrorism. Carl von Clausewitz had it right when he said that war is a continuation of political policy. Two observations are particularly apropos: "We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." And, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." 38 Civilizational beliefs and values will influence strategic interests and purpose.
There are some corollaries concerning doctrine, public diplomacy, awareness of personal filters and prejudices that influence the planning process, and interagency cooperation.
Application of these corollaries will enhance the usefulness of the primary recommendation.
Doctrine
TEP is an emerging process. Not only might DoD amend the TEP planning and execution processes in the future, but also the regional objectives that it addresses will change. As Table I , page 7 above, showed, CJCS narrowed the prioritization criteria to terms more suitable for the use of lethal force or the expenditure of significant resources. TEP prioritizations, however, ought to be less constrained. Specifically, the language concerning lethal force and risk should be recast into shaping, rather than defensive, terms so that Tier I priorities are those that should be carried out more diligently.
Awareness of Cultural Filters
CINCs and their planners unavoidably bring their own values and beliefs to the process. Whether they are aware of them and apply them wisely is another issue. For example, and venturing into territory where the brave dare not run, there is something of an expecta- tion that military officers will be "conservative realists." Times continue to change, however.
One officer writes, "At a minimum, realism's focus on threats may not inculcate the mindset necessary to seize opportunities for engagement and cooperation that could enhance the security of the state." Furthermore, "creativity and the flexibility to move beyond the status quo are qualities that are critical to enhance U.S. security in the current complex and fluid international system." 
Interagency Collaboration
The Hart-Rudman Commission's final report to the Congress, responding to concerns about the emerging international system, says, "The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat." 40 Clearly, the future demands coordinated action because anything less almost certainly will lead, at best, to squandering resources and time.
The U.S. Department of State (DoS), organized into six geographic bureaus, has the same inter-civilizational complexity as the Department of Defense's unified commands.
Furthermore, the Departments of State and Defense do not share a common perspective as Table V shows. As part of the interagency process, DoS and DoD ought to devote some time to examining the inter-civilizational issues across their regionalization schemes. 
Finally, take the maximum possible advantage of the CIA's capabilities with regard both to analysis and collection. 42 This would be especially true of the HUMINT agents collect when it relates specifically to cultural aspects.
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